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330 Alexandre De Streel
12.1 INTRODUCTION
To guarantee access and effective competition in the electronic com-
munications sector (i.e., the infrastructures for the services of the
Information Society such as fixed telephony network, mobile tele-
phony network, Internet connections, cable TV and satellite con-
nections), public intervention in the European Union mainly takes
place with two instruments that have converged over time.1 On the
one hand, there is the antitrust law that has been applied exten-
sively to become a sort of ‘regulatory antitrust’.2 On the other hand,
there is the sector regulation whose mode of intervention has been
aligned on antitrust law methodologies to become a sort of ‘pre-
emptive competition law’.3 Such evolution is interesting because it
questions the (remaining) differences between both instruments and
their optimal coordination and because the regulation of electronic
communications is the most advanced and might be transposed to
other networks industries (energy, railways or even possibly financial
services).4
This paper studies this evolution in the following way.
Section 12.2 gives a broad picture of the substantive and the institu-
tional issues. Section 12.3 goes into more depth on the application
of both branches of antitrust law (ex post and ex ante) since the
last fifteen years. Section 12.4 deals with sector regulation since its
last modification three years ago. Section 12.5 tries to propose an
efficient balance between both instruments as well as an optimal
coordination between the different institutions in charge. Finally,
Section 12.6 provides a conclusion.
1 Contrast with the tendency in the US where there is no such convergence; see
Geradin and Sidak (2005).
2 To adopt the expression of Cave and Crowther (2005) and de Streel
(2004).
3 To adopt the expression of Buiges (2004).
4 As suggested by the then Competition Commissioner Mario Monti
(2003).
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12.2 A BROAD PICTURE
12.2.1 Substantive law
In the European electronic communications sector,5 public authori-
ties rely on several instruments to discipline competitive behaviours,
as shown in Table 12.1: (1) competition law that applies to elec-
tronic communications, for example, to any sector of the economy6
and that may be divided into two branches (ex post competition law
Table 12.1 Competition law and sector regulation7
Competition
law – ex post
Competition
law – ex ante
Sector regulation/
Significant market
power (SMP) regime
Objective Maintain competition Increase competition
Increase competition Mimic competition
→ Market structure is broadly satisfactory → Market structure
is not satisfactory
Burden
of proof
to inter-
vene
1. Market definition
2. Dominant
3. Anticompetitive
conduct: agreement
or abuse of
dominance (high)
1a. Notified concentration
1b. Market definition
2. Significant impediment
to effective Competition
(low) (Conduct
presumed)
1a. Market selection
(very high)
1b. Market definition
2. SMP= dominance
(Conduct
presumed)
Remedies Mainly behavioural Mainly structural Mainly behavioural
Fines
Private damages
Note: The shadow area if the triggering factor for each legal instrument.
5 For the definition of electronic communication network and service, see article 2
of the Framework Directive.
6 Case 41/83 Italy v. Commission (British Telecommunications I) [1985] ECR 873.
Indeed, the application of sector regulation does not remove antitrust jurisdiction:
Commission Access Notice, para 22. The situation is more nuanced in the US
where the Supreme Court decided that, when sector regulation has been applied,
competition laws should not be applied in addition: Verizon v. Trinko 540 U.S.
682 (2004). On the different of approaches, see Larouche (2006).
7 This table is adapted from a presentation that Pierre Larouche made at an ETNO
workshop in October 2005.
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332 Alexandre De Streel
that punishes anticompetitive behaviours (agreements and abuses
of dominant position),8 and ex ante competition law that prevents
anticompetitive behaviours (mergers and autonomous full function
joint ventures));9 (2) sector regulation that always applies ex ante to
prevent anticompetitive behaviour.10
On the one hand, competition law has one main objective which
has become prevalent over time and is the maximization of consumer
welfare.11 This implies that competition law aims at efficiencies
(allocative, productive and dynamic) on the market by ensuring the
competitive structure is maintained and possibly even strengthened.12
To achieve those gaols, an antitrust authority applies ex post com-
petition law in several steps: (1) it starts by defining the relevant
8 Articles 81 and 82 EC and Council regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1, hereinafter Regulation 1/2003.
9 Council regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, O.J. [2004] L 24/1, herein Merger Regulation.
10 The sector regulation has been radically reformed in 2003 and is now mainly
made of four harmonization directives adopted under article 95 EC: directive
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services (Framework Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/33; directive 2002/20/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorization
of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive),
O.J. [2002] L 108/21; directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic
communications networks and services (Access Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/7;
directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March
2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications
networks and services (Universal Service Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/51. It is
also made of one liberalization directive adopted under article 86 EC: Commission
directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for
electronic communications networks and services, O.J. [2002] L 249/21.
11 In general, on the objectives of European competition law, see the contributions
in Ehlermann and Laudati (1998).
12 See in particular, Case T-87/05 Energias de Portugal v Commission [2005]
ECR II-0000, para 91 where the Court of First Instance accepted that European
competition law (in the case merger control) may be used to increase the level of
competition in the market.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Elsevier AMS Jobcode:0ptp12 15-6-2006 4:26p.m. Trimsize:152mm×229mm
Chapter 12 – Antitrust and Sector-Specific Regulation 333
market according to the small but significant nontransitory increase
in price (SSNIP) or the ‘hypothetical monopolist test’;13 (2) it then
determines whether one or several undertakings have sufficient mar-
ket power (in particular a single or joint dominant position, which
is a level of market power sufficient to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of competitors, customers, and ultimately con-
sumers);14 (3) finally, the authority determines whether the undertak-
ings with market power have committed an anticompetitive practice
(agreement or unilateral abuse). If it is this case, the authority
imposes a fine and/or behavioural remedies (to put an end to the anti-
competitive practice) or structural remedies if necessary and propor-
tionate.15 A national court may also provide for private damages.16
Thus, an intervention under ex post competition law is triggered by
an anticompetitive conduct.
Antitrust authority applies ex ante competition law in several steps.
(1a) A concentration should be first notified when fulfilling certain
criteria and should not be enforced before antitrust approval.17 (1b)
The authority then defines market according to the SSNIP economic
methodology. (2) It also determines whether the concentration would
significantly impede effective competition (in particular by creating
a single or collective dominant position).18 Such assessment is done
in two phases. After the first phase, the authority decides if it does not
13 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of com-
munity competition law, O.J. [1997] C 372/5. For an application to the electronic
communication sectors, see Commission Guidelines of 9 July 2002 on market
analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the community
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ
[2002] C 165/6, herein Commission Guidelines on market analysis, para 33–69.
14 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207; Case 85/76 Hoffman-
La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461; Case T-342/99 AirTours v. Commission
[2002] ECR II-2585, para 62; Guidelines on market analysis, paras 70 to 106.
15 Article 7 of regulation 1/2003.
16 Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297.
17 A concentration should be notified to the European Commission when (1) it is a
merger or an autonomous full function joint venture and (2) it reach certain thres-
hold ofworldwide andEuropean turnover:Articles 1 and 3of theMergerRegulation.
18 Article 2 of the Merger Regulation.
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have serious doubts that the concentration would impede effective
competition, or conversely, it opens a second phase of investiga-
tion.19 After this second phase, the authority decides whether the
concentration would significantly impede effective competition or
not.20 If the authority has doubts or thinks that the concentration
would indeed impede competition, the notifying parties may pro-
pose during the phase and/or phase remedies that should remove all
competitive concerns (the remedies should preferably be structural,
although they may be behavioural provided they affect the structure
of the market).21 Otherwise, the authority prohibits the merger. Thus,
an intervention under ex ante competition is triggered by a notified
concentration which significantly impedes effective competition.
On the other hand, sector regulation has three objectives: pro-
motion of effective competition, the internal market, and the users’
interest.22 However, the law gives important margin of discretion to
the regulatory actors on the ranking of those objectives that may be
contradictory and on the means to achieve them. In particular, the
law does not decide whether the regulators should actively promote
the development of infrastructure (e.g., broadband connections) as a
soft industrial policy marker23 or merely control the market as a hard
trustbuster.24 The part of sector regulation that deals with market
power mainly aims to ensure efficiency by favouring competitive
market structure or by mimicking the results of a competitive market
structure.25
19 Article 6 of the Merger Regulation. The first phase is of 25 or 35 working days.
20 Article 8 of theMergerRegulation. The second phase is of 95 or 105working days.
21 Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, para 319; Case
C-12/03P Tetra Laval v Commission [2005] ECR I-0000, para 86.
22 Article 8 of the Framework Directive.
23 As suggested in Communication from the Commission of 1 June 2005, i2010 –
A European Information Society for growth and employment, COM(2005) 229.
24 On those ambiguities in objectives, see Granham (2005, pp. 8–14) and Hocepied
and de Streel (2005, pp. 147–154).
25 European Regulators Group (ERG) Common Position of 1 April 2004 on the
approach to appropriate remedies in the new regulatory framework, ERG (03)
30rev1, herein ERG Common Position on remedies, Chapter 4.
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To achieve those goals, a regulatory authority follows three steps
when imposing obligations on the operators.26 (1a) It starts by select-
ing markets where sector regulation would be more efficient than
antitrust to solve competition problems.27 In practice, it does so
according to three cumulative criteria (high permanent and nonstrate-
gic entry barriers, no competitive dynamics behind these barriers
and inefficiency of antitrust remedies to solve the competitive prob-
lems).28 (1b) Then, it delineates the boundaries of the selected
markets according to antitrust methodologies (the SSNIP or hypo-
thetical monopoly test).29 (2) It determines also whether an operator
enjoys a single or collective dominant position or could leverage a
dominant position from a closely related market.30 (3) If it is the
case, it imposes proportionate regulatory remedies to be chosen from
a menu provided in the directives (transparency, nondiscrimination,
accounting separation, compulsory access and price control), or any
other type of remedy (even structural ones like divestiture) with the
prior agreement of the Commission.31 Thus, an intervention under
sector regulation is triggered by a market that has the characteristics
where competition law remedies would be insufficient.
26 On those steps, see Buiges (2004), Cave (2004), Garzaniti (2003, chapter 1),
Krüger and Di Mauro (2003), and de Streel (2004).
27 Recital 27 of the Framework Directive.
28 Recitals 9–16 of the Commission Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February
2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communi-
cations sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ [2003] L 114/45, herein
Commission Recommendation on relevant markets.
29 Article 15 of the Framework Directive; Commission Recommendation on rele-
vant market; Commission Guidelines on market analysis, paras 33–69.
30 Articles 14 and 16 of the Framework Directive; Commission Guidelines on
market analysis, para 70–106; Revised European Regulators Group Working Paper
of September 2005 on the SMP concept for the new regulatory framework, ERG
(03) 09rev3.
31 Articles 8–13 of the Access Directive (for the remedies regarding the wholesale
markets); articles 16–19 of the Universal Service Directive (for the remedies
regarding the retail markets); and ERG Common Position on remedies.
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Sector regulation has been aligned to antitrust methodologies
because it was supposed to meet several good governance prin-
ciples.32 It makes the regime more flexible and based on solidly
grounded economic principles that ensure regulatory decisions closer
to the reality of the market. And this increased flexibility would
not be at the expense of legal certainty (as decisions will be based
on more than forty years of antitrust case-law), nor harmonization
(as NRAs’ decisions are based on legal principles that are strongly
Europeanized). The system was also deemed to ensure a progres-
sive removal of obligations as competition develops in the different
markets (market-by-market sunset clauses) and facilitates the tran-
sition towards the mere application of competition law when sector
regulation will no longer be necessary.
12.2.2 Institutional design
To implement such instruments, many institutions are involved as
illustrated in Figure 12.1.
On the one hand, the main actors in applying antitrust are the
twenty-five National Competition Authorities (NCAs), the European
Commission, and the national courts. Ex post antitrust may gener-
ally be applied concurrently by the Commission (its Competition
Directorate General),33 the NCAs,34 and the national courts.35
32 Buiges (2004) and Cave (2004).
33 Article 4 of regulation 1/2003. Note that the Commission may only intervene
when the trade between member states is susceptible to be affected by the allegedly
anticompetitive practice: Guidelines of the Commission of 30 March 2004 on the
effect on trade concept contained in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. [2004]
C 101/81.
34 Article 5 of regulation 1/2003 and specific national competition laws. In some
member states, the NRAs have concurrent powers with the NCAs to apply ex post
antitrust in the electronic communications sector; see, for instance, the UK: Office
of Fair Trading Guidelines of December 2004 on Concurrent application to regu-
lated industries.
35 Article 6 of regulation 1/2003 and specific national competition laws.
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Euorpean courts
230 EC
Commission
DG Infso + DG Comp
ERG
226 EC
7 FWD
4 FWD
Art. 81,82,86 EC
National courts
15 DR
226 EC
11 DR
NRA NCA
3,16 FWD
Commission
DG Comp
ECN
234 EC 234 EC
230 EC
Figure 12.1 Relationship between regulatory actors.37 Straight line: strict control; Dotted
line: loose control; EC: EC Treaty; 226 EC: infringement procedure against a Member
State; 230 EC: annulment procedure against the Commission; 234 EC: preliminary ruling
question; FWD: Framework Directive 2002/21; DR: Decentralisation Regulation 1/2003;
ERG: European Regulators Group; ECN: European Competition Network (Telecom Work-
ing Group); NRA: National Regulatory Authority; NCA: National Competition Authority.
Ex ante antitrust is applied exclusively by the Commission if the
concentration has a community dimension38 or by NCAs if the con-
centration does not have such community dimension.
To ensure checks and balances and efficient decisions, the NCAs
AU1
are under the control of several authorities. At national level, they
36 For simplicity, I do not include the role of the National Ministries, the CoCom
and the Council.
37 For simplicity, I do not include the role of the National Ministries, the CoCom
and the Council.
38 Article 2 of the Merger Regulation. In some circumstances, the Commission
may refer back to a NCA a concentration with community dimension: articles 4
and 9 of the Merger Regulation.
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are controlled by the national courts as any interested party may
appeal an NCA decision.39 At the European level, NCAs are under
the double control of the Commission which may decease an NCA
before it adopts a final decision to ensure the consistency of antitrust
law across member states,40 and which may initiate an infringement
procedure at the Court of Justice against a member state whose NCA
violated European law.41 NCAs also face peer pressure through their
participation in the European Competition Network,42 which has a
specific working group on telecommunications matters. Finally, the
NCAs which have the characteristics of a tribunal (such as a body
established by law, permanent, independent, applying rule of law
and whose jurisdiction is compulsory, procedure is inter partes) may
directly ask preliminary questions to the Court of Justice on the
interpretation of European law.43 In this sense, the NCAs are under
the direct supervision of the Court of Justice.
39 The organization of such appeal procedure is left to the member state according
to their procedural autonomy, but should be effective according to the general
principles of European law derived from article 10 EC: Case C-276/01 Steffensen
[2003] ECR I-3755, para 60, case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR
I-6297, para 29, case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana [2002] ECR I-8003. Note that
the Commission may help the national courts in their interpretation of Euro-
pean antitrust: article 15 of the regulation 1/2003 and Commission notice of
30 March 2004 on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of
the EU member states in the application of articles 81 and 82 EC, O.J. [2004]
L 101/54.
40 Article 11(6) of the regulation 1/2003 and paras 50–57 of the Commission notice
of 30 March 2004 on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities,
O.J. [2004] C 101/43.
41 Article 226 EC, as interpreted by Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Commune
de Milano [1989] ECR I-1839.
42 Commission notice of 30 March 2004 on cooperation within the Network of
Competition Authorities, O.J. [2004] C 101/43.
43 Article 234 EC. According to these criteria, a preliminary question from the
Spanish NCA was accepted in Case C-67/91 Dirección General de Defensa de
la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca Privada and others (Spanish
Banks) [1992] ECR I-4785, but a question from the Greek NCA was refused in
case C-53/03 Syfait and Others v GlaxoSmithKline [2005] ECR I-0000.
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The Commission is controlled by the European courts where its
decision may be appealed.44 The courts examine whether the proce-
dures have been respected, the substantive law (e.g., the concept of
dominance) has been correctly interpreted, the facts have been cor-
rectly established and no manifest errors in the economic assessment
of those facts have been done.45
Thus, at the top of the pyramid lie the European courts whose case-
law should be respected by all administrative and judicial national
and European authorities according to the principle of the primacy
of European law.46 In this context, the national courts may refer
preliminary ruling question to the Court of Justice.47
On the other hand, sector regulation is applied concurrently by
the NRAs48 and by the national courts.
To ensure checks and balances and efficient decisions, the NRAs
are under the control of several authorities. At the national level,
they should cooperate closely with the NCAs as SMP assessment
involves antitrust methodologies,49 hence are under the scrutiny of
the antitrust authorities. In addition, NRAs are controlled by the
national courts whose organization is left to the member states but the
European law minimally provides that appeal body should take into
account the merits of the case.50 At the European level, the NRAs
are under a triple control51 of the Commission (Directorate General
Information Society and Media and Competition Directorate Gen-
eral): first, the Commission reviews (in a preventive manner) in two
44 Article 230 EC.
45 Case C-12/03P Tetra Laval v Commission [2005] ECR I-0000, para 39. See
Vesterdorf (2005).
46 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
47 Article 234 EC.
48 Article 3 of the Framework Directive.
49 Articles 3 and 16 of the Framework Directive.
50 Article 4 of the Framework Directive, Lasok (2005).
51 Hocepied and de Streel (2005).
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phases all NRAs’ draft decisions affecting trade between member
states and may veto part of them when violating European law;52 sec-
ond the Commission may take (in a repressive manner) to the Court
of Justice a member states whose NRA violated European law;53
third the Commission may take an antitrust decision that would
be an indirect critique of the regulator’s policy.54 NRAs also face
peer pressure through their participation in the European Regulators
Group (ERG).55 However, contrary to their antitrust counterparts,
the NRAs may not ask preliminary questions to the Court of Justice
because of their obvious administrative nature.56
Again at the top of the pyramid lie the European courts whose
case-law should be respected by all administrative and judicial
national and European authorities.
52 Article 7 of the Framework Directive and Commission recommendation
2003/561 of 23 July 2003 on notifications, time limits and consultations provided
for in article 7 of directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic com-
munications networks and services, OJ [2003] L 190/13. After the first phase of
one month, the Commission may merely comment on the compatibility of the
NRA draft decision with EU law, or if it has doubts it may open a second phase
review. After this second phase review of two months, the Commission may
(but is not obliged to) veto the NRA draft decision if it violates EU law.
53 Article 226 EC (see note 39). However, until now, the all infringement
actions related to violation of European law by a national legislator and not by
an NRA.
54 Articles 81, 82, 86 EC. This was the case in the decision Deutsche Telekom.
55 Commission decision of 29 July 2002 establishing the European Regulators
Group for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, O.J. [2002] L
200/38, as modified by Commission decision of 14 September 2004, O.J. [2004]
L 293/30. See the website of ERG: http://erg.eu.int.
56 Case C-256/05 Telekom Austria [2005] ECR I-0000, paras 10–11 and para
45 of the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in case C-462/99 Connect
Austria Gesellschaft für Telekommunikation v Telekom-Control-Kommission, and
Mobilkom Austria [2003] ECR I-5197.
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12.3 COMPETITION LAW
12.3.1 Ex post competition law
12.3.1.1 Substantive issues
(1) The mode of intervention and the type of cases taken At
the European level, the mode of intervention of the Commission in
the electronic communications sector was based on broad sectoral
approach, which is different from the interventions in the other sec-
tors of the economy based on a case-specific approach. In fact, the
Commission behaves more like an industrial regulator than a mere
antitrust authority. Thus, it adopted three general guidelines,57 which
explained how antitrust rules would apply to some competitive prob-
lems and were not based on a stock of previous individual cases:
in 1991, on the application of competition rules to the telecom-
munications sectors;58 in 1998, on the application of antitrust rules
to access agreement;59 and in 2000, on the application of antitrust
rules to the compulsory access of the local loop (i.e., the last mile
of the network where the economies of scale and scope are the
largest).60
The Commission also conducted six sector enquiries or quasisec-
tor enquiries where the Commission sent questionnaire to all the
operators to better understand the dynamics of the marketplace and
57 Guidelines have also been used in other network industries like the postal sector:
notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the
postal sector and on the assessment of certain state measures relating to postal
services, O.J. [1998] C 39/2.
58 Commission guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the
telecommunications sector, O.J. [1991] C 233/2.
59 Commission notice of 31 March 1998 on the application of competition rules
to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, O.J. [1998] C 265/2,
hereinafter Access Notice.
60 Communication from the Communication of 26 April 2000 on the unbundled
access to the local loop, O.J. [2000] C 272/55.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Elsevier AMS Jobcode:0ptp12 15-6-2006 4:26p.m. Trimsize:152mm×229mm
342 Alexandre De Streel
possibly identify anticompetitive practices:61 in 1997, on the high
prices for international calls;62 in 1998, on the high prices for fixed-
to-mobile calls;63 in 1999, on the delivery of leased lines;64 in 2000,
on the high prices for mobile international roaming,65 and on the
refusal to give access to the local loop;66 in 2004, on the sales of
sports rights to 3G and Internet.67
In a second stage and on the basis of the information collected
during the sector enquiries, the Commission opened several indi-
vidual cases.68 So far, all cases cover pricing practices that were
either exploitative (excessive prices) or exclusionary (price squeeze
or predatory pricing). They took on average two to three years to
be decided and most of them have been settled informally. As a
consequence of this approach, there has been few formal decision,
hence the case-law in the sector is relatively poor. However, the few
decisions should not hide the fact that Commission intervention has
been more intense in electronic communication sector than in the
other sectors of the economy (Table 12.2).
61 Sector enquiries are based on article 17 of regulation 1/2003. In quasisector
enquiries, no formal sector enquiry were opened, but questionnaires were sent to
all operators of the market segment under review. On these enquiries: Choumelova
and Delgado (2004).
62 IP/97/1180 of 19 December 1997; IP/98/763 of 13 August 1998; IP/99/279 of
24 April 1999.
63 IP/98/141 of 10 February 1998; IP/98/707 of 27 July 1998; IP/98/1036 of
26 November 1996: IP/99/298 of 4 May 1999.
64 IP/99/786 of 22 October 1999; Working Document of the Commission services
of 8 September 2000 on the initial results of the leased lines sector inquiry;
IP/00/1043 of 22 September 2000; IP/02/1852 of 11 December 2002.
65 IP/00/111 of 4 February 2000; Working Document of Commission services of
13 December 2000 on the initial findings of the sector inquiry into mobile roaming
charges.
66 IP/00/765 of 12 July 2000. Report done by Squire-Sanders-Dempsey, Legal Study
on Part II of the Local Loop Sectoral Inquiry, February 2002, available at http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/local_loop/.
67 IP/04/134 of 30 January 2004. Concluding Report of the Commission of
21 September 2005 on the Sector Inquiry into the provision of sports content over
third generation mobile networks.
68 For an overview of the cases: Garzaniti (2003, chapter 6).
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Elsevier AMS Jobcode:0ptp12 15-6-2006 4:26p.m. Trimsize:152mm×229mm
Chapter 12 – Antitrust and Sector-Specific Regulation 343
Table 12.2 Commission abuse of dominant cases
Market
segment
Exclusionary pricing Exploitative pricing
Fixed
narrowband
– Price squeeze between
interconnection charges and
retail business tariffs: DT 199669
– Excessive accounting rates:
OTE, ETP, Austria Telekom,
Finland, Telecom Italia, Ireland,
Portugal70
Fixed
broadband
– Price squeeze between full
unbundling charges and retail
ADSL tariffs: DT 2003
– Price squeeze between shared
access charges and retail access
tariffs: DT 200471
– Predatory retail ADSL price:
Wanadoo 2003
– Price squeeze between
national/regional bitstream and
ADSL tariffs: Telefonica 200672
Leased lines – Excessive prices for international
leased lines: Belgium, Italy,
Spain 200273
Mobile – Price squeeze between mobile
termination charges and retail
mobile tariffs: KPN 200274
– Excessive mobile termination:
Germany and Italy 199975
– Excessive wholesale roaming
charges: O2 and Vodafone UK
2004,76 T-Mobile and Vodafone
Germany 2005.77
Note: The cases in italics have led to a formal decision of the Commission and are cited in
the Annex.
69 Against Deutsche Telekom: IP/96/543 of 25 June 1996 and IP/96/975 of 31
October 1996.
70 In Greece, Austria, Luxembourg, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal: IP/99/279.
71 IP/04/281 of 1 March 2004.
72 MEMO/06/91 of 22 February 2006.
73 In Belgium, Italy and Spain.
74 IP/02/483 of 27 March 2002.
75 Against all the mobile operators of Germany and of Italy: IP/99/298 of 4 May
1999.
76 IP/04/994 of 26 July 2004.
77 IP/05/161 of 10 February 2005.
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At the national level, more decisions have been taken than at the
European level, although the interventions of the NCAs vary sig-
nificantly across countries.78 For instance, the French Competition
Council has been extremely active, in particular in opening of the
local access market to stimulate broadband development79 and con-
demning cartel in the mobile segment.80 In general, most cases relate
to exclusionary pricing practices.
(2) The remedies imposed In the majority of the cases, the
Commission imposed behavioural remedies in the form of reducing
of excessive price or ending a price squeeze. In some cases, the
Commission went further and used ex post antitrust cases to speed
up liberalization in the member statesthat were the most reluctant
to open their markets.81 No Member State has ever imposed a full
structural separation of the incumbent, but the United Kingdom
has recently in an unprecedented move imposed a quasi-structural
separation of BT.82
12.3.1.2 Institutional issues
At European level, the vertical relationship between the Com-
mission and the NCAs followed the approach set in the
78 For a summary of some cases, see International Competition Network (2006,
Appendix 1) and for a description of national price squeeze cases: Geradin and
O’Donoghue (2005).
79 Bourreau (2003). Competition Council Decision 00-MC-01 of 18 February 2002,
9Telecom/France Telecom I, upheld by the Appeal Court of Paris decision in 30
March 2000, and Competition Council Decision 04-D-18 of 13 April 2004, 9Tele-
com/France Telecom II, upheld by the Appeal Court of Paris in 11 January 2005;
Competition Council Decision 05-D-59 of 7 November 2005, 9Telecom/France
Telecom III.
80 Competition Council Decision 05-D-65 of 30 November 2005.
81 For instance, the Commission closed the DT 1996 case on the conditions that
the German government opened its telecommunications markets.
82 Ofcom Final statements of 22 September 2005 on the strategic review of the
telecommunications and undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise
Act 2002.
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Cooperation Notice: cases were decided by the best-placed author-
ity and the Commission took only cases with sufficient European
interest.83
The diagonal relationship between the Commission and the NRAs
was complementary and followed the approach described in the
Access Notice: priority was given to the NRAs.84 Thus, if the NRAs
were able to intervene, these cases have been passed to them,85
although the Commission maintains a control over the regulators.86
If the NRAs were not able to act, the cases usually have been settled
by the Commission or, more exceptionally, a formal decision was
adopted.87
At the national level, the transversal relationship between
the NCAs and the NRAs was also complementary. For instance, the
Dutch NCA intervened in mobile termination regulation when the
NRA’s decision had been quashed by a national court for lack of
jurisdiction.88 However, there may also be a conflict between the
approach of NRA and the one of the NCA. For instance, the Ital-
ian NCA condemned Telecom Italia for a regulatory price squeeze
case.89
83 Commission notice of 30 March 2004 on cooperation within the Network of
Competition Authorities O.J. [2004] C 101/43.
84 Commission Access Notice, paras 26–32.
85 For instance, for cases for excessive fixed retention rates and fixed termination
rates have been dealt by the NRAs and only closed by the Commission when
prices decreased sufficiently.
86 For instance in the decision Deutsche Telekom, the Commission condemned
a regulated operator (that enjoyed some discretion within the regulatory limit
to reduce the abusive practice) as the Commission disagreed with the national
regulator. For a critique of this decision, Geradin (2004, pp. 1549–1552), Larouche
(2006) and Petit (2005, pp. 194–195).
87 Commission decision Wanadoo.
88 OPTA and NMa press release 03–50 of 5 December 2003.
89 AGCM decision of 16 November 2004, annulled in May 2005.
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12.3.2 Ex ante competition law: mergers and joint ventures
12.3.2.1 Substantive issues
(1) The type of cases notified In the electronic communications
sector, several cases have been notified and decided by the Commis-
sion due to the reshaping of the industrial landscape in the aftermath
of liberalization.90 In the mid-1990s when telecom markets were pro-
gressively opened to competition, national incumbents set up joint
ventures to offer enhanced international services to multinationals
(e.g., Atlas joint venture between France Telecom and Deutsche
Telekom).91
At the turn of the twenty-first century when consolidation of ICT
industries took place, WorldCom (renamed MCI and recently bought
by Verizon) was the leader in the restructuring of the Internet market
by acquiring many rivals companies (e.g., acquisition of MCI and
then Sprint). Similarly, Vodafone was the leader of the restructuring
of the mobile markets by acquiring many rivals (e.g., acquisition
of Airtouch of the US and then Mannesmann of Germany). At the
same time when convergence was taking place, Internet and telecom
companies merge or form joint venture to offer fully converged
services (e.g., merger between AOL and Time Warner and between
Vivendi and Seagram).92
More recently, there has been a consolidation in the pay-TV indus-
try (e.g., NewsCorp buying Telepiu to form Sky Italia).93 Today,
incumbents from Western Europe are buying smaller foreign oper-
ators (e.g., Telefonica of Spain buying the English mobile operator
O2), especially in Eastern Europe.
90 For a description of those cases, see Garzaniti (2003, chapter 8), Le Blanc and
Shelanski (2003), and de Streel (2004).
91 FT and DT extend this joint venture with Sprint of the US in Global One. See
also the Concert joint venture between BT and MCI, and the Unisource joint
venture between Telia of Sweden, KPN of the Netherlands and Swiss Telecom.
92 See also decision Vadafone/Vizzavi/Canal+.
93 See also decision Sogecable/ViaDigital.
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However, except in the Nordic country,94 there has been no full-
fledged merger between incumbents because the customer demand is
not yet Europeanized, the regulations vary significantly across coun-
tries and the governments are reluctant to accept such consolidation
for reasons of national patriotism.
(2) The remedies imposed The types of remedies imposed have
been diverse. The Commission imposed structural remedies that
stimulate infrastructure competition (e.g., cable divestiture) for the
parties to lose their dominant position on the traditional markets and
their ability to leverage and foreclose entry in emerging markets.95
As the effects of these measures could only take place with time,
they were complemented by behavioural remedies aiming at forcing
access to key facilities (e.g., content, fixed telecom infrastructure,
mobile infrastructure, technical services for pay-TV or interactive-
TV services).
As illustrated in Table 12.5 in the Appendix, the Commission has
been more severe (read interventionist) in the electronic communi-
cations sector than in the economy as a whole because it blocked
2.2 per cent of the operations (instead of 0.6 per cent on average)
and imposed remedies in 8.4 per cent of the cases (instead of 7 per
cent on average).
This is due to several reasons. The first reason was to prevent a
dangerous circle of self-reinforcing market power between related
markets, whereby parties leverage their power from established mar-
kets (e.g., the local loop) to secure a dominant position on emerging
markets (e.g., the digital interactive service) and, in turn, lever-
age back from the emerging market to strengthen their power on
94 Merger between Telia of Sweden and Telenor of Norway later abandoned, and
merger between Telia of Sweden and Sonera of Finland.
95 Sometimes, such ex ante antitrust remedies have paved the way for the future
regulation. For instance, compulsory access to local loop was imposed in 1999
in the Telia/Telenor decision and taken over one year later by sector regulation:
European regulation 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, O.J. [2000] L 336/4.
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the established markets.96 The second reason of the strict stance
of the Commission was to support the liberalization program of
the Commission. For instance, in the early joint ventures between
incumbents to provide enhanced international services like Atlas, the
member states concerned were encouraged to accelerate liberaliza-
tion in order to make a clearing under conditions of the alliances
possible. The dynamics of the process thus created a parallelism of
interest in accelerating liberalization between incumbents (in order
to have their alliances cleared), member states (in order to allow the
development of the potential of their national markets) and the Com-
mission (in order not to be obliged to block new services and new
technologies).97 The third reason of the strict stance of the Commis-
sion was to ensure noneconomic policy objectives, such as pluralism
in the media in the merger involving content related services like
AOL/TimeWarner.98
Note, however, that sector regulation has been taken into account
when deciding the appropriate remedies. Thus, the Commission
imposed more lenient remedies or no remedy when the behaviours
of the parties to a joint venture were under strict control of a sector-
specific authority and there were less risk of abuse and leverage.99
96 This vicious circle is particularly worrying in ICT sector for three reasons
at least. First, several markets are only emerging and their development should
not be controlled by a particular company. Second, these markets are evolving
very quickly and any anticompetitive behaviour could have rapid and irreversible
effects. Third, most of the markets are characterized by network effects, that
lead to path dependency with early developers (first-mover advantage) becoming
dominant by capturing new growth (bandwagon affect) so inefficient solution may
be adopted: see Monti (2000).
97 Ungerer (2001) referring to the decisions Atlas and GlobalOne.
98 Arino (2004).
99 For instance, the Commission imposed less remedy in Concert joint venture
between BT and MCI that were strictly controlled by the English and American
NRA than in Atlas joint venture between FT and DT that was not controlled
by NRA. Such approach is in line with the case-law: joined cases T-374/94,
T-375/94, T-384/94, T-388/94 European Night Services and Others v Commission
[1998] ECR II-3141, para 221. Note that such an approach is not followed in
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12.3.2.2 Institutional issues
The vertical relationship between the Commission and the NCAs
was weak because the role of the latter in controlling merger was
much less important than the one of the Commission (and also
compared to their role at controlling anticompetitive behaviours)
as most major cases were of European dimension, hence were the
exclusive competence of the Commission. However, some important
cases were referred back to the NCAs, for example, the merger
Sogecable/Via Digital100 decided by the Spanish authority.
The diagonal cooperation between the Commission and the NRAs
has also been less intense than under ex post antitrust because of
the short deadlines to decide a merger case. However, the situation
improved over time and can also be seen now as complementary as
the Commission relied on the NRA to implement merger remedies101
or has taken the market analysis of the NRA into account when
deciding whether a merger would be anticompetitive.102
12.3.3 Appraisal of the application of antitrust in the electronic
communications sector
Regarding the use of antitrust, its expansive role in the elec-
tronic communications sector has been criticized. Veljanovski (2001)
sector regulation where the NRA should assess a dominant/SMP position without
taking account of the regulation in place on the analysed operator for the obvious
reason of alleviating a vicious circle of lifting regulation only because there
was regulation: Commission decision of 20 February 2004, case FI/2003/24–26
(markets 4 and 6) and Commission decision of 17 May 2005, case DE/2005/144
(market 9).
100 Commission decision of 14 August 2002, Sogecable/Via Digital, M. 2845,
upheld in joined cases T-346/02 and T-347/02 Cableuropa v Commission [2003]
ECR II-0000. This case was very similar to the NewsCorp/Telepiu merger.
101 Decision Newscorp/Telepiu, para 259.
102 Commission decision of 19 September 2003, Vodafone/SinglePoint, M. 3245,
para 24.
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argues that the merger approach has been too stringent because
economic literature103 shows that anticompetitive leverage is more
rare than lawyers would think. Larouche (2000) argues that com-
petition law has been stretched beyond its reasonable limits and
the institutional and legitimacy settings of antitrust do not justify
its quasiregulatory role.104 More generally, American authors like
Audretsch et al. (2001), Evans and Schmalensee (2001), Katz and
Shelanski (2004), or Posner (2001) emphasize the dynamic charac-
teristics of the industries and the necessary adaptation of antitrust
policy.105
However, given the history of the sector, an interventionist stance
of antitrust in the electronic communications sector might be justified
on static grounds (because dominant position is pervasive in the
sector) as well as on dynamic grounds (because these dominant
positions are often the result of past legal protection and not of
private investment decisions taken in a competitive environment
and whose incentives should be preserved).106 Moreover, in sectors
where effective competition does not yet exist but is possible in
the future, there may be a case for antitrust to actively promote
entry of competitors that are equally efficient than the incumbents,
or even less efficient competitors, for two related reasons: on a
overall market perspective, it may pay in the long run to have many
actors competing, and on a individual firm perspective, efficiency
may increase over time as the customer bases and the operation
scales increases.107 Therefore, there may be an economic case for a
‘different antitrust’ in sector where dominant position due to previous
103 Rey and Tirole (2003).
104 Although the Court of First Instance has implicitly admitted this quasi-
regulatory role in case T-87/05 Energias de Portugal v Commission [2005] ECR
II-0000, para 91.
105 This has been recently implicitly recognized by the Court of First Instance in
case T-328/03 O2 Germany v Commission [2006] ECR II-0000, para 110.
106 Fingleton (2006) and Motta and de Streel (2006, pp. 109–112).
107 Conseil de la Concurrence français (2003,p. 72) and the Annex of ERG Com-
mon Position on remedies.
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incumbency is prevalent. Yet, it should always be justified with
sound economic reasoning (which was not always the case in the
merger cases so far) and it should be strictly limited to the network
industries that were developed under legal monopoly protection and
not be extended to other sectors of the economy.108
12.4 SECTOR REGULATION
12.4.1 Ex ante sector regulation
12.4.1.1 Substantive issues
(1) The market segments regulated On the basis of the three crite-
ria to select market susceptible to sector regulation (i.e., high perma-
nent and nonstrategic entry barriers, no competitive dynamics behind
these barriers and inefficiency of antitrust remedies to solve the com-
petitive problems), the Commission has proposed to the NRAs to
analyse eighteen markets (seven retail and eleven wholesale).109 In
general, the Commission identified mainly upstream access markets
because there is no barrier (or only low barriers) to enter the retail
markets when wholesale regulation is efficient.110
On the fixed voice segment, the Commission identified two
retail access markets (for residential and business customers), four
retail services markets (same segmentation residential/business;
and segmentation between local/national and international ser-
vices), and three wholesale markets (call origination, transit and
108 Moreover, the argument for a more interventionist competition law is weaker
when there is a strong sector regulation as in this case, the authorities may rely
on sector regulation instead of antitrust to achieve efficiency on the market.
109 Commission recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 on relevant prod-
uct and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible
to ex ante regulation, OJ [2003] L 114/45.
110 In fact, the few retail markets identified have been so for historical but not
economical reasons.
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call termination)111 adding up to the whole connection between two
customers. On the fixed broadband data segment, the Commission
identified two wholesale access markets: access at the local loop level
and access at the bitstream level, which is somewhat further up in the
network.112 On leased lines segment, the Commission identified one
retail market (the minimum set of leased lines which corresponds to
five types of leased up to 2Mbits),113 and two wholesale markets (ter-
minating and trunk segments), which adds up to the whole connec-
tion between two customers. In the mobile segment, the Commission
identified three wholesale markets: access and call origination as well
as termination, which are the two extremes of the mobile network,114
and international roaming, which presents specific economic prob-
lems.115 In the broadcasting segment, the Commission identified only
one wholesale market for broadcasting transmission.
In general, the NRAs have followed such market definitions,
sometimes segmenting further the market defined by the Commission
(in particular for the broadcasting market) and sometimes adding
new markets (Table 12.3).116
111 The termination market is defined on each individual network because the
‘calling-party pays’ principle creates an externality between the caller (who ulti-
mately pays the termination charge but does not choose the terminating network)
and the called party (who chooses such network but does not pay the charge).
112 Local loop refers to the physical circuit connecting the network termination point
at the subscriber’s premises to the main distribution frame (MDF) or equivalent
facility in the fixed public network (article 2(e) of the Access Directive). Bitstream
Access refers to the provision of transmission capacity between an end-user con-
nected to a telephone connection and the point of handover to the new entrant
(recommendation from the Commission of 26 April 2000 on unbundled access to
the local loop, OJ [2000] C 272/55).
113 Commission decision 2003/548 of 24 July 2003 on the minimum set of leased
lines with harmonized characteristics and associated standards referred to in article
18 of the Universal Service Directive, O.J. [2003] L 186/43.
114 See note 110.
115 See note 64.
116 Communication from the Commission of 6 February 2006 on Market Reviews
under the EU Regulatory Framework: Consolidating the internal market for elec-
tronic communications, COM(2006) 28.
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Table 12.3 Markets susceptible to sector regulation
Retail markets Wholesale markets
Fixed voice 1. Access for residential
2. Access for
nonresidential
3. Local and/or national
services for residential
4. International services
for residential
5. Local and/or national
services for
nonresidential
6. International services
for nonresidential
8. Call origination
9. Call termination on individual
public networks
10. Transit
Fixed
narrowband
data
Idem 8
Fixed
broadband data
11. Unbundled access (including shared
access) to metallic loops and
subloops
12. Wholesale broadband access
Fixed dedicated
access
7. Minimum set of
leased lines
13. Terminating segments
14. Trunk segments
Mobile voice 15. Access and call origination
16. Call termination on individual
mobile networks
17. International roaming
Broadcasting 18. Broadcasting transmission services
(2) The remedies imposed Although, the NRAs have the choice
between a list of five remedies (transparency, nondiscrimination,
accounting separation, compulsory access and price control) and the
obligation to only choose the proportionate ones, they impose in
general the full suite of them on all markets, and in particular price
control at forward looking long-term incremental cost.117 Most reg-
ulators apply the ladder of investment which consists of regulating
117 Ibidem.
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the different rungs of an imaginary investment ladder (i.e., retailing,
IP Networks, backhaul, DSLAM, local loop) and only removing
regulation of one rung when entrants have climbed that rung.118
Thus, the policy aims not only to create a level-playing field but
also to actively support entrants. As a consequence, the NRAs reg-
ulate almost all markets of the long Commission list, with only few
exceptions like some retail services markets and the wholesale fixed
transit and mobile access that some NRAs decided not to impose
any remedy (see Tables 12.6a–12.6c in the Appendix).
12.4.1.2 Institutional issues
The horizontal relationships between the NRAs have clearly been
reinforced with the creation of the ERG, but are still insufficient to
create a single market for electronic communications. In the vertical
relationship between the Commission and the NRAs, the influence
of the former has been considerable: it starts the SMP process by
defining the markets to be analysed by the NRAs and usually such
definitions are followed by NRAs and has already veto five draft
decisions (without counting several draft decisions that have been
withdrawn to alleviate such veto).119
12.4.2 Appraisal of the application of sector regulation
After more nearly three years of implementation, the new sector reg-
ulation which was more based on theoretical thinking than practical
experience has not fully delivered the good governance principles it
118 Cave and Vogelsang (2003); Cave (2006); ERG Broadband market competition
report of May 2005, ERG(05) 23.
119 See Table 12.7 of the Appendix. In addition, the Commission gives substantives
indications in the prenotification meetings held with the NRAs to discuss in
advance any controversial issue.
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pursued.120 In particular, the principles of proportionality and legal
certainty are no achieved. Indeed, there is an increase of regulation as
more market segments are regulated and more operators are regulated
on each segment. At this stage, I can not prove that regulators have
intervened beyond the optimal level because that would require a
clear and articulated definition of optimal regulation as well as a full
cost-benefit that has not be done until now and is outside the scope
of this paper.121 However, it is a fact that the never-ending expan-
sion of regulation does not match to the deregulatory rhetoric of the
European and national legislators and regulators. Also the strategies
of the regulatory actors are not sufficiently clear in particular for
the emerging markets (do they want to push for infrastructure-based
competition of service-based competition, do they want short-term
competition or long term competition, do they want to do industrial
policy or not).
One reason of such failure is the lack of clear objectives in the
law and the inability or unwillingness of the regulators to arbitrate
between conflicting priorities. The legislator tried to hide the ques-
tion of objectives and escape those conflicts by aligning sector reg-
ulation with antitrust methodologies. However, such methodologies
do not evacuate the fundamental regulatory questions and worse,
they add difficulties.122 The main difficulty is that standard antitrust
120 The principles were: flexibility, transparency, technological neutrality, harmo-
nization, proportionality, and legal certainty. For an overview of the state of
implementation of the sector regulation: communication from the Commission of
20 February 2006, European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets
2005 (11th Implementation Report), COM(2006) 68.
121 In particular, some argue that the ladder of investment has had a positive
effect on investment and long term competition: Cave (2006) and ERG Broadband
market competition report of May 2005, ERG(05) 23 whereas other argue that it
is not the case: Oldale and Padilla (2004) and Hausman and Sidak (2005).
122 Note also that antitrust principles are insufficient to base sector regulation
because they detect all kinds of market power and are not able to screen the
subset among them – hard core market power – that justify regulation. Thus, mere
antitrust principles should be completed by other elements that have nothing to
do with antitrust principles, that is, the three selection criteria.
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principles were developed for antitrust practice in stable industries
and need adaptations to be applicable in the context of the sector
regulation for dynamic markets. First, standard antitrust principles
are mainly suited to horizontal markets but need to be substan-
tially modified to deal with vertical chains of production (which
is the main focus of sector regulation).123 For instance, standard
antitrust principles would not by themselves be capable of defining
a derived non-merchant wholesale market124 and there is risk that
the different services making a production chain are choked up in
numerous artificially narrow antitrust markets.125 Second, standard
antitrust principles are suited to stable industries where competition
is mainly in price but need to be adapted to deal with innovation
and the Schumpeterian creative destruction competition.126 Third,
standard antitrust principle are suited to one-sided markets but need
to be adapted to deal with two-sided markets where there are strong
interactions between each side of the markets.127
123 Larouche (2000, pp. 203–211) and Richards (2006, pp. 206–209).
124 Although the Court of Justice admitted that the antitrust methodology may be
used to define a hypothetical non-merchant wholesale market in case C-418/01
IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR I-0000, para 44.
125 This will become more problematic as the industry moves towards new-
generation networks. According to the International Telecommunications Union,
a new-generation network is ‘a packet based architecture fostering the provision-
ing of existing and new/emerging services through a loosely coupled, open and
converged communications infrastructures’.
126 Audrestch et al. (2001), Dobbs and Richards (2004), and Evans and
Schmalensee (2001). For instance, some monopoly power defined with static
method may in fact increase welfare when it is necessary to increase innova-
tion and when it is constrained by the threat of other innovation and creative
destruction.
127 Gual (2003), Evans (2003), and Rochet and Tirole (2004). When markets are
two-sided, regulators should not only look at the level of the price on each side
of the market, but also at the structure of the price between the different sides. In
other words, it may be efficient that one side is charged below whereas the other
side is charged above costs (cf. a heterosexual disco where usually women pay
less and men more than the cost of entry).
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In addition to this difficulty, there are several other drawbacks
and risks with the alignment on antitrust principles. First, the use
of a legal concept is always linked to the objective of the legal
rule for which it is used. As the objectives of antitrust and sector
regulation may differ (recall that the objective antitrust is the max-
imization of long term consumer welfare, whereas the objectives
of sector regulation may be broader), the interpretation of a same
antitrust concept may also differ creating legal confusion and uncer-
tainty.128 Second, antitrust principles are complex and have been
under significant reform recently, moving from a legalistic form-
based approach towards a more economic effects-based approach.129
Third, and linked to institutional issues, antitrust principles do not
constrain the NRAs very much in their actions (as many NRAs adapt
them quite flexibly) but they do constrain the Commission in its
comment under the article 7 review of NRAs’ draft decisions (as
the Commission always looks at the impact of its comments on its
pending and future antitrust cases).
Therefore, critics propose to base sector regulation on the concept
of bottleneck.130 Indeed, the first best might be to base sector reg-
ulation on specific concept (like bottleneck) to alleviate confusion
between antitrust and sector regulation objectives and to be simpler
128 See the different interpretations of price squeeze in antitrust law and in sector
regulation proposed by Grout (2002). Similarly, the first president of the French
Supreme Court argues that a similar legal antitrust concept may be interpreted
differently depending of the objectives of the legal instruments for which it is
used: Canivet (2006, p. 5).
129 Communication from the Commission of 20 April 2004, A pro-active Compe-
tition Policy for a Competitive Europe, COM(2004) 293.
130 Larouche (2000, pp. 359–403), Richards (2006, p. 220), and Squire-Sanders
and Analysys (1999, p. 147). The UK regulator Ofcom decided during its strategic
review to base its equality of access regulation on enduring economic bottlenecks
which are defined as ‘the parts of the network where there are little prospects for
effective and sustainable competition in the medium term’. It comprises whole-
sale line rental; metallic path facility, IPStream and backhaul extension service:
Ofcom final statements of 22 September 2005 on the strategic review of the
telecommunications, at para 4.6.
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to use. However, there is already an implicit notion of bottleneck in
the current sector regulation during the market selection step131 and
the complementary use of antitrust concepts is probably a second
best option in the European context because it ensures a more eco-
nomic approach and some harmonization between NRAs. However,
it is important that antitrust concepts do not evacuate the question of
objectives as it is the case today and that their underlying economic
theories are adapted to the dynamic characteristics of the sector.
A second reason for the regulatory failures is that the institutional
design has not been sufficiently thought through by the European
legislature. In general, regulatory authorities do not have incentive to
deregulate because of the well-established problems of state bureau-
cracy implying that authorities have a tendency to increase their
activities132 and the regulatory brakes of the current law (national
appeal and Commission review) are not efficient enough. More criti-
cally, NRAs do not have incentives to take into account the dynamic
side of competition (investment, innovation) but only the static side
(evolution of price, number of competitors) because the indicators on
which they are evaluated are mainly static (level of price, concentra-
tion index).133 In other words, NRAs are performing relatively well
with regard to their incentives, but such incentives are not aligned
with the long-term welfare of the consumers.
Thus, there is a need to better adapt those incentives by evaluat-
ing the NRAs on more dynamics indicators and by reinforcing the
regulatory brakes.
131 Recital 27 of the Framework Directive as interpreted by recitals 9–16 of the
recommendation on relevant markets.
132 The tendency to overregulate because of state bureaucracy may be counterbal-
ance by a tendency to underregulate in the countries where NRAs are captured by
the incumbents.
133 See the yearly Commission implementation reports, available at http:
//europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/implementation_enforcement/
index_en.htm More dynamic indicators are currently being designed by the
British NRA to evaluate the impact of the strategic review: Ofcom statement
of 8 February 2006 on evaluating the impact of the strategic review of
telecommunications.
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12.5 OPTIMAL BALANCE BETWEEN RULES AND
COORDINATION BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS
12.5.1 The optimal balance between antitrust and sector regulation
12.5.1.1 Market failures in electronic communications
Public authorities should aim to maximize the welfare of their cit-
izens and markets are supposed to be the best means to ensure
such welfare maximization. Thus, governments should intervene
only when the mere functioning of the markets does not deliver this
objective.
Economists distinguish between three types of market failure.134
(1) The first market failure is the presence of excessive market
power (e.g., a monopoly operator) which may lead to excessive
price or too little innovation. Excessive market power is caused by
legal and economic entry barriers or by anticompetitive behaviours.
The concept of economic entry barriers is controversial in the lit-
erature with two opposing views.135 The narrow (Stiglerian) view
limits the barriers to the absolute cost advantages of the incumbents
(e.g., access to best outlet in town, or consumer switching costs)
but excludes all entrants’ costs that have also been borne by the
incumbents (e.g., high fixed and sunk costs). The broad (Bainian)
view extends the concept of barriers to all factors that limit entry and
enable incumbents to get a supranormal profit, hence includes abso-
lute cost advantages but also economies of scale and scope. (2) The
second market failure is the presence of an externality (like network
externality or tariffs-mediated externality) which may lead to under-
consumption in case of positive externality and overconsumption in
134 Here I follow the definition of the International Competition Network (2006,
p. 4), which considers that market failure occurs when resources are misallocated or
allocated inefficiently (i.e., this includes misallocation in both static and dynamic
sense), resulting in loss value, wasted resources, or some nonoptimal outcome.
135 McAfee et al. (2004).
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case of negative externality.136 (3) The third market failure is the
presence of information asymmetries (e.g., the absence of knowledge
of the price) which may lead to under- or overconsumption.
In telecommunications, the two first categories lead to the stan-
dard distinction between (1) the one-way access (or access model)
which concerns the provision of bottleneck inputs by an incumbent
network provider to new entrants and (2) two-way access (or the
interconnection model) which concerns reciprocal access between
two networks that have to rely upon each other to terminate calls.137
In addition, each type of market failure may be structural and
result from the supply and demand conditions of the market, or may
be behavioural and artificially (albeit rationally) ‘manufactured’ by
the firms, leading to the matrix shown in Table 12.4.138 Since the
decline of the structure–conduct–performance paradigm in indus-
trial economics, it is now recognized that nonstrategic and strategic
market failures are closely linked together and that structure influ-
ences conduct as much as conduct influences structure. However,
it remains possible (and useful when choosing between the differ-
ent instruments of public intervention) to identify the causes of the
nonefficient market results and to distinguish between structural and
behavioural market failures.
12.5.1.2 Choice between competition law and sector regulation
To tackle these different market failures, public authorities dis-
pose of several legal instruments (in particular competition law,
136 For instance, less than the optimal number of customers may decide to join a
network if new customers are not compensated, when joining the network, for an
increase in the welfare they create for the already existing customers. The ERG
defines the network externality as ‘the effect which existing subscribers enjoy as
additional subscribers join the network which is not taken into account when this
decision is made’: ERG Common Position on remedies, p. 127.
137 See Armstrong (2002), Laffont and Tirole (2000), and Vogelsang (2003).
138 Several potential behavioural market failures have been identified by the ERG
in its Revised Draft Common Position on remedies at Chapter 2.
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Table 12.4 Market failure susceptible to public intervention.139
Structural/nonstrategic Behavioural/strategic
Excessive
market power
Cell 1 Cell 2
– Bainain entry barriers: High and
sunk fixed with uncertainty
– Reinforcement of dominance
– Stiglerian entry barriers: Important
absolute cost advantages (e.g.,
switching costs)
– Vertical leveraging
– Legal barriers
– Horizontal leveraging
→ One-way access (access model)
Externality Cell 3 Cell 4
– Network effects
– Two-sided markets
→ Two-way access
(interconnection model)
– Strategic network effects
(e.g., loyalty program or
tariff mediated externality
Information
asymmetry
Cell 5 Cell 6
sector regulation, consumer law) that they must combine in the most
efficient way. Specifically, to find the appropriate balance between
competition law and sector regulation, regulators should determine
the main differences between both instruments, confront them with
the market failures to be dealt with and accordingly decide which
instrument is the most efficient in solving the market failure.
According to the present author,140 the two principal and related
substantive differences are that (1) sector regulation mainly deals
139 This table is only a stylized and static view of the market reality that is more a
starting point to raise the relevant questions than a checklist to provide definitive
answers on the scope of public intervention. Telecommunications markets are
intrinsically dynamic and a rationale based on static view may lead to inappropriate
and overinclusive public intervention. For instance, a high level of market power
does not always lead to long term inefficiencies justifying intervention.
140 On the differences between sector regulation and antitrust law, see also Laffont
and Tirole (2000, pp. 276–279), Katz (2004), and Temple Lang (2006). Many
authors consider the main difference is that antitrust law aims at maintaining the
level of competition whereas sector regulation aims at increasing the level of
competition. According to the present author, the difference is not always verified
in practice as some antitrust decisions (in particular merger decisions) and that
has been endorsed the community courts.
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with unsatisfactory market structures whereas competition law deals
with unsatisfactory firms’ behaviours, and (2) the burden of proof
for sector regulation to intervene on the selected markets141 is lower
than in the case of antitrust law. The main institutional difference
is that (3) sector regulation is only applied by national authorities,
whereas antitrust law is applied by European authorities as well (the
Commission).
Because of the first difference (related to structure and
behaviours), it is efficient that sector regulation deals with structural
market failures and competition law deals with behavioural ones.
Because of the second difference (related to the burden of proof), it
is efficient that the factor used to select markets for regulation is set
at a very high level because once a market area is selected, interven-
tion is relatively easy. In other words, the regulation should focus
on market where the risks of type I errors (false condemnation) are
low and the risks of type II errors (false acquittal) are high.142 This
is especially important because the costs of type I errors are large in
dynamic markets.143 Taking both arguments together, any possible
regulation should limited to cells 1 and 3 of Table 12.4, that is, struc-
tural market failures due to excessive market power and externalities.
Because of the third difference (related to institutional design),
it might be justified that antitrust law applies in addition to sector
regulation when NRAs have not performed their tasks adequately.144
141 The burden of proof for sector regulation to intervene is high when all steps of
Table 12.1 are considered, but is low when steps 1 and 2 are passed.
142 I link here the burden of proof to intervene with the risks and the costs of type
I and type II errors, following the tradition of the Chicago School recently revived
by inter alia Evans and Padilla (2004).
143 Hausman (1997) valued the delay of the introduction of voice messaging
services from late 1970s until 1988 at US$ 1270 million per year by 1994, and
the delay of the introduction of mobile service at US$ 100 000 million, large
compared with the 1995 US global telecoms revenues of $180 000 million/year.
144 That was the case in the decision Deutsche Telekom. However, it is a better
institutional design that regulatory decisions are controlled by judicial bodies (a
national court or ultimately the European Court of Justice) instead of an antitrust
authority: Larouche (2005, p. 175) and Petit (2005, p. 198).
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The question is then whether those optimal rules are followed.
The practice under article 82 EC is in line with the rules as the Com-
mission and the NCAs passed the case to the NRAs when possible
and only decided the case when the regulators could not intervene or
were intervening unsatisfactorily. The practice of the merger regu-
lation also respects the rules as under the previous rigid 1998 sector
regulation (where the possibility to impose regulation was limited)145
the Commission imposed many obligations to complement NRA,
whereas under the current 2003 sector regulation (which is more
flexible to impose regulation) the Commission imposes less merger
remedies.
12.5.2 The optimal institutional coordination
An optimal coordination between the many institutions involved in
the regulation of the electronic communications is primordial given
the overlapping jurisdictions between several authorities, hence the
risks of forum shopping by complainants, increased regulatory costs,
or conflicting decisions.146
First, the mechanisms for horizontal coordination between the
NCAs of the twenty-five member states(i.e., the European Com-
petition Network and the important role of the Commission as
primus inter partes) are sufficient given their already strong Euro-
pean attitude. However, the mechanisms for horizontal coordination
among the NRAs of the twenty-five member states(i.e., ERG) are
insufficient because they are much less Europeanized than their
antitrust counterparts.147 Thus, coordination mechanisms should be
145 On this regulatory framework, see Garzaniti (2000), and Larouche (2000).
146 On the need for coordination see: Larouche (2005, pp. 166–170), and Petit
(2005, pp. 182–187).
147 This is partly due to the fact that most NCAs have been created after that
the Commission has played a substantial role in applying and modelling the
competition law, whereas NRAs have been created before that the Commission
play an active role in modelling the sector regulation.
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reinforced, possibly with the creation of a European regulatory
authority.
Second, the mechanisms for vertical coordination between the
Commission and the NCA (i.e., possibility of decease of the Com-
mission and infringement procedures) are sufficient. However, the
mechanisms for coordination between the Commission and the
NRAs (i.e., Commission review and infringement procedure) are
insufficient because they are weaker than those antitrust coordina-
tion mechanisms and yet NRAs are less Europeanized. Thus, they
should be strengthened to achieve an internal market for electronic
communications.
Third, the mechanisms for transversal coordination between the
NCA and the NRA of a specific country need to be reinforced
in most of the member states. There is no optimal model as such
relationships depend very much on the institutional characteristics of
each country,148 but improvements may be achieved by integrating
the NRA inside the NCA (as done in New Zealand) or by having a
clearer division of tasks between authorities.149
Fourth, the mechanisms for diagonal coordination between the
Commission and the NRA of each member state need to be clarified,
possibly by a better division of tasks between authorities.
12.6 CONCLUSION
To conclude,
Antitrust authorities are justified to intervene more strictly in elec-
tronic communications sector (or more generally network industries),
but their interventions should always be based on sound economic
rationale and the same extensive approach should not permeate other
sectors of the economy.
148 International Competition Networks (2006, pp. 26–29).
149 Larouche (2005, p 176) proposes, on the basis of the experience so far, that the
Commission and the NCAs would be in charge of the assessment of dominance,
whereas the NRAs would be in charge of the choice of remedies.
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Sector regulation is justified to be aligned on antitrust principles
because of the institutional structure of the European Union, but it
is only a second best, and alignment of concepts should not lead to
an alignment of objectives. Indeed, the antitrust principles should
neither be mystified (Même la plus belle fille du monde ne peut
donner que ce qu’elle a) nor demonized. These are like economic
glasses to be put by a public authority, no more, no less. They
do not evacuate the fundamental regulatory questions to be solved
(what type of competition the regulator is aiming for? what is the
timeframe of regulatory intervention?) and do not pre-empt on the
objectives to be followed.
Sector regulation and competition law are converging but some
important divergences remain, in particular regarding the burden of
proof and the institutions in charge. Such divergences should deter-
mine the scope of sector regulation which should only be applied
when more efficient than antitrust, that is, when costs and the risks
of type I errors are small and the costs and the risks of type II errors
are large.
Sector regulation should respect good governance principles: flex-
ibility, objectivity, transparency, harmonization, proportionality (in
particular regulatory creep should be alleviated) and legal certainty.
NRAs should be cautious not to automatically extend a regulatory
approach suited for infrastructures laid down under legal monopoly
conditions to new Schumpeterian infrastructures and should be less
hypocritical about their actions (and not invoke the mantra of dereg-
ulatory rhetoric when they are increasing regulation for good or for
wrong/poor reasons).
The institutional design should be better taken into account when
establishing the rules150 and in particular the transversal coordination
between regulatory authorities with overlapping competences should
be developed.
150 See in general Sapir (2004).
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APPENDIX
Table 12.5 Statistics of merger cases
All cases Electronic communications cases151
Total With
remedies
Prohibition Total With
remedies
Prohibition
1990 12 0 0 0 0 0
1991 63 6 1 1 0 0
1992 60 7 0 3 0 0
1993 58 2 0 3 0 0
1994 95 4 1 6 0 1
1995 110 6 2 14 0 2
1996 131 3 3 12 1 0
1997 172 9 1 15 1 0
1998 235 16 2 26 2 2
1999 292 27 1 28 5 0
2000 345 40 2 56 9 1
2001 335 23 5 43 2 0
2002 279 15 0 17 1 0
2003 212 17 0 9 2 0
2004 249 16 1 13 0 0
2005 313 15 0 29 0 0
TOTAL 2661 206 19 275 23 6
100% 7.0% 0.6% 9.3%
100% 8.4% 2.2%
Source: European Commission.
151 NACE code I.64.20 (telecommunications) and O.92.20 (radio and television
activities).
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Table 12.6a List of ex ante decisions with remedies, under Merger Regulation and article
81 EC (as of April 2006)
Case Date No. Legal
basis ∗
Publication ∗∗ Cat∗∗∗
Eirpage 18 Oct. 1991 32.737 81.3 EC O.J. [1991] L 306/23 2
BT/MCI 27 July 1994 34.857 81.3 EC O.J. [1994] L 223/36 1
Atlas 17 July 1996 35.337 81.3 EC O.J. [1996] L 239/23 1
Phoenix/Global One 17 July1996 35.617 81.3 EC O.J. [1996] L 239/57 1
RTL/Veronica/Endemol II 17 July 1996 M. 553 8.2 MR O.J. [1996] L 294/14 3
BT/MCI (II) 14 May1997 M. 856 8.2 MR O.J. [1997] L 336/1 1
Unisource Obligations
repealed in Unisource (II)
29 Oct. 1997
29 Dec. 2000
35.830
36.841
81.3 EC O.J. [1997] L 318/1
O.J. [2001] L 52/30
1
Uniworld 29 Oct. 1997 35.738 81.3 EC O.J. [1997] L 318/24 1
WorldCom/MCI 8 July 1998 M. 1069 8.2 MR O.J. [1999] L 116/1 1
NC/Canal+/CDPQ/
BankAmerica
3 Dec. 1998 M. 1327 6.2 MR 1
BT/AT&T 30 March 1999 JV. 15 8.2 MR 1
TPS
Upheld in Metropole
3 March 1999
18 Sept. 2001
36.237
T-112/99
81.3 EC O.J. [1999] L 90/6
ECR [2001] II-2459
3
Cégétel+4 20 May 1999 36.592 81.3 EC O.J. [1999] L 218/14 1
Vodafone/AirTouch 21 May 1999 M. 1430 6.2 MR 2
AT&T/MediaOne 23 July 1999 M. 1551 6.2 MR 1
Télécom Développement 27 July 1999 36.581 81 EC O.J. [1999] L 218/24 1
BiB/Open 15 Sept. 1999 36.539 81.3 EC O.J. [1999] L 312/1 3
Telia/Telenor 13 Oct. 1999 M. 1439 8.2 MR O.J. [2001] L 40/1 1
Orange/Mannesmann 20 Dec. 1999 M. 1760 6.2 MR 2
TelekomAustria/Libro 28 Feb. 2000 M. 1747 6.2 MR 1
BSkyB/KirchPayTV
Upheld in ARD
21 March 2000
30 Sept. 2003
JV. 37
T-158/00
6.2 MR
ECR [2003] II-XXX 3
BT/Esat 27 March 2000 M. 1838 6.2 MR 1
EADS 11 April 2000 M. 1745 6.2 MR
Vodafone/Mannesmann 12 April 2000 M. 1795 6.2 MR 2
Vodafone/Vizzavi/Canal+ 20 July 2000 JV. 48 6.2 MR 3
FranceTelecom/Orange 11 Aug. 2000 M. 2016 6.2 MR 2
AOL/TimeWarner 11 Oct. 2000 M. 1845 8.2 MR O.J. [2001] L 268/28 3
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram 13 Oct. 2000 M. 2050 6.2 MR 3
YLE/TDF/Digita 21 June 2001 M. 2300 6.2 MR 3
Pirelli/Telecom Italia
Modification remedies
20 Sept. 2001
5 Aug. 2002
M. 2574 6.2 MR IP/02/1183 1
Telia/Sonera 10 July 2002 M. 2803 6.2 MR 1
NewsCorp/Telepiù 2 April 2003 M. 2876 8.2 MR O.J. [2004] L 110/73 3
DaimlerChrysler/DT 30 April 2003 M. 2903 8.2 MR O.J. [2003] L 300/62 3
UK Network sharing 30 April 2003 38.370 81.3 EC O.J. [2003] L 200/59 2
Network Sharing
Rahmenvertrag
16 July 2003 38.369 81.3 EC O.J. [2004] L 75/32 2
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Table 12.6a (Continued)
Partly annulled in O2
Germany
2 May 2006 T-328/03 ECR [2006] II-XXX
Telenor/Canal+ 29 Dec. 2003 38.287 81.3 EC 3
Telefonica/O2 10 Jan. 2006 M. 4035 6.2 MR 2
T-Mobile/tele.ring 26 April 2006 M. 3916 8.2 MR 2
Table 12.6b List of ex ante decisions – prohibition
Case Date No. Legal
basis
Publication Cat
MSG Media Service 9 Nov. 1994 M. 469 8.3 MR O.J. [1994] L 364/1 3
Nordic Satellite
Distribution
19 July 1995 M. 490 8.3 MR O.J. [1996] L 53/20 3
RTL/Veronica/Endemol (I)
Upheld in appeal
Endemol
20 Sept.1995
28 April 1999
M. 553
T-221/95
8.3 MR O.J. [1996] L 134/32
ECR [1999] II-1299
3
Bertelsmann/Kirch/
Premiere
Appeal removed
27 May 1998 M. 993
T-123/98
8.3 MR O.J. [1999] L 53/1 3
Deutsche
Telekom/BetaResearch
27 May 1998 M. 1027 8.3 MR O.J. [1999] L 53/31 3
MCIWorldCom/Sprint
Annulled in MCI
WorldCom
28 June 2000
28 Sept. 2004
M. 1741
T-310/00
8.3 MR O.J. [2003] L 300/1
ECR [2004] II-XXX
1
Table 12.6c List of ex post decisions (article 82 EC)
Case Date No. Legal
basis
Publication Cat
British Telecom
Upheld in appeal
10 Dec. 1982
20 March 1985
29.877
41/83
82 EC O.J. [1982] L 360/36
ECR [1985] 873
1
Deutsche Telekom
Appeal pending
21 May 2003 37.451
T-271/03
82 EC O.J. [2003] L 263/9 1
Wanadoo
Appeal pending
16 July 2003 38.233
T-340/03
82 EC 1
∗ 6.2 MR: Merger Regulation, remedies in phase I; 8.2 MR: Merger Regulation, remedies in phase
II; 81.3 EC: EC Treaty, individual exemption.
∗∗ If no mention, the decision is published on the web site of DG Competition.
∗∗∗ Category 1: Fixed (including Internet or cable) or fixed and mobile services; category 2: Mobile
services; category 3: Content-related services.
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Table 12.7 SMP analysis in the twenty-five member states (as of April 2006)
 A
T
B
E
C
Y
D
E
D
K
E
E
E
L
E
S
F
I
F
R
H
U
I
E
I
T
L
T
L
U
M
T
N
L
P
L
P
T
S
E
S
I
S
K
C
Z
U
K
1
2
3
4 V
5
6 V
7
8    
9 V
10 V     
11    
12    
13    
14      
15 V
16 
17       
18        
Legend
Regulation 
No regulation 
SMP designation, but remedies not yet decided 
 Not yet decided 
V: Commission veto 
Statistics: phase I without comments: 33 per cent; phase I with comment: 65 per cent; phase II 
accepted: 0.6 per cent; phase II vetoed: 1.5 per cent.  
REFERENCES
Arino, M. (2004): ‘Competition law and pluralism in European digital broadcasting:
Addressing the gaps’, Communications & Strategies 57: 97–128.
Armstrong, M. (2002): ‘The Theory of access pricing and interconnection’, in Cave M.,
S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang (eds), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics v. 1,
North-Holland, 295–384.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Elsevier AMS Jobcode:0ptp12 15-6-2006 4:26p.m. Trimsize:152mm×229mm
370 Alexandre De Streel
Audretsch, D. B., W. J. Baumol and A.E. Burke (2001): ‘Competition policy in dynamic
markets’, International Journal of Industrial Organization 19: 613–634.
Bourreau, M. (2003): ‘Local loop unbundling: The French case’, Communications & Strate-
gies 49: 119–135.
Buiges, P. (2004): ‘A Competition policy approach’, in P. Buiges and P. Rey (eds), The
Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, E. Elgar, 9–26.
Cave, M. (2004): ‘Economic aspects of the new regulatory regime for electronic com-
munication services’, in P. Buiges and P. Rey (eds), The Economics of Antitrust and
Regulation in Telecommunications, E. Elgar, 27–41.
Cave, M. (2006): ‘Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment’,
Telecommunications Policy 30: 223–237.
Cave, M. and P. Crowther (2005): ‘Pre-emptive competition policy meets regulatory
antitrust’, European Competition Law Review 26: 481–490.
Cave, M. and I. Vogelsang (2003): ‘How access pricing and entry interact’, Telecommuni-
cations Policy 27: 717–727.
Choumelova, D. and J. Delgado (2004): ‘Monitoring competition in the telecommunications
sector: European Commission Sector Enquiries’, in P. Buiges and P. Rey (eds), The
Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, E. Elgar, 269–284.
Conseil de la Concurrence français (2003): ‘Etudes thématiques: L’orientation des prix vers
les coûts’, in Rapport d’activités 2002, 67–88.
Dobbs, I. and P. Richards (2004): ‘Innovation and the new regulatory framework for
electronic communications in the EU’, European Competition Law Review 25: 716–730.
Ehlermann, C. D. and L. L. Laudati (1998): European Competition law Annual 1997: The
Objectives of Competition Policy, Hart.
Evans, D. and R. Schmalensee (2001): ‘Some economic aspects of antitrust analysis in
dynamically competitive industries’, NBER Working Paper 8268.
Evans, D. S. (2003): ‘The antitrust economics of multi-sided platform’, Yale Journal on
Regulation 20: 325–381.
Evans, D. S. and A. J. Padilla (2004): ‘Designing antitrust rules for assessing unilateral
practices: A neo-Chicago approach’, CEPR Discussion Paper 4625.
Fingleton, J. (2006): ‘Demonopolizing Ireland’, in C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds),
European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of Dominant Position?,
Hart, 53–68.
Garnham, N. (2005): ‘Contradiction, confusion and hubris: A critical review of European
Information Society Policy’, ENCIP Paper.
Garzaniti, L. (2000): Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition
Law and Regulation, 1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell.
Garzaniti, L. (2003): Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition
Law and Regulation, 2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell.
Geradin, D. (2004): ‘Limiting the scope of article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU
learn from the US Supreme Court’s judgement in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS,
and Deutsche Telekom’, Common Market Law Review 41: 1519–1553.
Geradin, D. and R. O’Donoghue (2005): ‘The concurrent application of competition law
and regulation: The case of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector’,
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1: 355–425.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Elsevier AMS Jobcode:0ptp12 15-6-2006 4:26p.m. Trimsize:152mm×229mm
Chapter 12 – Antitrust and Sector-Specific Regulation 371
Geradin, D. and J. G. Sidak (2005): ‘European and American approaches to antitrust
remedies and the institutional design of regulation in telecommunications’, in M. Cave,
S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang (eds), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics,
v. II, North-Holland, 518–556.
Grout, P. A. (2002): ‘Competition law in telecommunications and its implications for
common carriage of water’, CMPO Working Paper 02/056.
Gual, J. (2003), ‘Market definition in the telecoms industry’, CEPR Working Paper 3988.
Hausman, J. A. (1997): ‘Valuing the effect of regulation on new services in telecommuni-
cations’, Brookings Papers: Microeconomics: 1–38.
Hausman, J. A. and J. G. Sidak (2005): ‘Did mandatory unbundling achieve its purpose?
Empirical evidence from five countries’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1:
173–245.
Hocepied, C. and de Streel A. (2005): ‘The ambiguities of the European electronic commu-
nications regulation’, in E. Dommering and N. van Eijk (eds), The Round Table Expert
Group on Telecommunications Law, University of Amsterdam, 139–190.
International Competition Network (2006): Working Group on Telecommunications Ser-
vices, Report to the Fifth Annual Conference in Cape Town.
Katz, M. L. (2004): ‘Antitrust or regulation? US public policy in telecommunications
markets’, in P. Buiges and P. Rey (eds), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in
Telecommunications, E. Elgar, 243–259.
Katz, M. L. and H. A. Shelanski (2004): ‘Merger policy and innovation: Must enforcement
change to account of technological change?’, NBER Working Paper 10710.
Krüger, R. and L. Di Mauro (2003): ‘The article 7 consultation mechanism: Managing the
consolidation of the internal market for electronic communications’, Competition Policy
Newsletter 3: 33–36.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (2000): Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press.
Larouche, P. (2000): Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunica-
tions, Hart.
Larouche, P. (2002): ‘A closer look at some assumptions underlying EC regulation of
electronic communications’, Journal of Network Industries 3: 129–149.
Larouche, P. (2005): ‘Co-ordination of European and Member State Regulatory Policy:
Horizontal, vertical and transversal aspects’, in D. Geradin, R. Munoz, and N. Petit (eds),
Regulatory Authorities in the EC: A New Paradigm for European Governance, E. Elgar,
164–179.
Larouche, P. (2006): ‘Contrasting legal solutions and comparability of the EU and US
experiences’, Presented at the Conference Balancing Antitrust and Regulation in Network
Industries.
Lasok, K. P. E. (2005): ‘Appeals under the new regulatory framework in the electronic
communications sector’, European Business Law Review 16: 787–801.
Le Blanc, G. and H. Shelanski (2003): ‘Telecommunications mergers in the EU and US:
A comparative institutional analysis’, in F. Lévêque and H. Shelanski (eds), Merger
Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law, E. Elgar, 172–207.
McAfee R., H. G. Mialon, and M. A. Williams (2004): ‘What is a barrier to entry’,
American Economic Review 94(2): 461–465.
Monti, M. (2000): ‘Competition and information technologies’, Speech 18 September.
Monti, M. (2003), ‘Competition and regulation in the new framework’, Speech 15 July.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Elsevier AMS Jobcode:0ptp12 15-6-2006 4:26p.m. Trimsize:152mm×229mm
372 Alexandre De Streel
Motta, M. and A. de Streel (2006): ‘Excessive pricing and price squeeze in European
competition law’, in C.D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law
Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of Dominant Position?, Hart, 91–125.
Oldale, A. and A. J. Padilla (2004): ‘From state monopoly to the ‘investment ladder’:
Competition policy and the NRF’, in Bergman M. (ed.), The Pros and Cons of Antitrust
in Deregulated Markets, Swedish Competition Authority, 51–77.
Petit, N. (2005): ‘The proliferation of national regulatory authorities alongside competition
authorities: A source of jurisdictional confusion’, in D. Geradin, R. Munoz, and N. Petit
(eds), Regulatory Authorities in the EC: A New Paradigm for European Governance,
E. Elgar, 180–212.
Posner, R. (2001): Antitrust Law, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press.
Rey, P. and J. Tirole (2003): ‘A primer on foreclosure’, in M. Armstrong and R. Porter
(eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization v. III, North-Holland, forthcoming.
Richards, P. (2006): ‘The limitations of market-based regulation of the electronic commu-
nications sector’, Telecommunications Policy 30: 201–222.
Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole (2004): Two-Sided Markets: An Overview, Mimeo.
Sapir, A. (2004): An Agenda for Growing Europe, Oxford University Press.
Squire-Sanders-Dempsey and Analysis (1999): Consumer demand for telecommunications
services and the implications of the convergence of fixed and mobile networks for the
regulatory framework for a liberalized EU market, Study for the European Commission.
de Streel, A. (2004): ‘Remedies in the electronic communications sector’, in D. Geradin
(ed.), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regula-
tion, Intersentia, 67–124.
Temple Lang J. (2006): ‘Competition policy and regulation: Differences, overlaps, and
constraints’, Presented at the Conference Balancing Antitrust and Regulation in Network
Industries.
Ungerer, H. (2001): ‘Use of EC competition rules in the liberalisation of the European
union’s telecommunications sector’, Speech 6 May.
Veljanovski, C. (2001): ‘EC antitrust in the new economy: Is European commission’s view
of the network economy right?’, European Competition Law Review 22: 115–121.
Vesterdorf, B. (2005): ‘Standard of proof in merger cases: Reflections in the light of recent
case law of the community courts’, European Competition Journal 1.
Vogelsang, I. (2003): ‘Price regulation of access to telecommunications networks’, Journal
of Economic Literature XLI: 830–862.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Elsevier AMS Jobcode:0ptp12Query 15-6-2006 3:38p.m. Trimsize:152mm×229mm
Chapter No: 12
Query No Query
AU1: Please provide citation to footnote 36
